Only few further definitions, following the idea of the definitions presented above exist. Among them, the dependability definition of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) ("IEC 60050, : Dependability and quality of service -Part 1: Common terms" see IEC, 1990) 1 , the definition from the IFIP 10.4 Working Group on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance (see International Federation for Information Processing, ) and the definition from the Department of Defence (see Department of Defence, 1970) . These classical definitions of dependability do, however, offer two major drawbacks: 1. They do not define a directly applicable and repeatable way to compute the dependability of a system. 2 2. The dynamics of the system are not directly taken into account when investigating the dependability of the system. Using the information gained from the mathematical system model, for example, seems obvious when investing the dependability of that system. Neglecting the dynamics of a system means ignoring all information coming from that model. Furthermore the dynamics of a system is crucial for fault scenarios not only in the case of autonomous mobile systems. In this chapter a theoretical framework is proposed, that does not only describe a dependability definition and dependability means in relation to the dynamics of a system but also presents a repeatable and system-independent way of how to measure dependability. Dependability is mainly understood as an integrated concept that additionally consists of different attributes (see also Figure 1 ). According to (Avizienis et al., 2004b; Avizienis et al., 2004a; Randell, 2000) dependability consists of the following attributes:
• Availability readiness for correct service, • Reliability continuity of correct service, • Safety absence of catastrophic consequences for both user(s) and environment, • Confidentiality absence of unauthorized disclosure of information, • Integrity absence of improper system state alteration and • Maintanability ability to undergo modifications and repairs. For further information as to the impact of these attributes on the dependability of the complete system, please refer to (Avizienis et al., 2004a) and (Dubrova, 2006) . Further definitions with slightly different attributes exist in the literature (see i.e. Candea, 2003; Dewsbury et al., 2003) . The main idea, i.e. dependability consists of different attributes, is still of value and will be part of the definition proposed below. The authors would like to express, however, that more than a static aggregation of attributes is needed for the description of the dependability of an autonomous mobile system. These attributes are always related to a static model, even if error propagation is dynamic. The proposal for dependability measurement also includes the attribute approach as a special case for being compatible with the qualitative dependability definitions. Unfortunately a few of the attributes have different, not necessarily similar, definitions. Still missing is a formal and comprehensive definition for a few attributes. As for autonomous mobile systems, not all attributes are of equal importance. For a discussion about the set of attributes important for autonomous mobile systems the reader is referred to (Rüdiger et al., 2007b) . 
Framework for a theory of dynamical systems
In order to develop a formal definition for the dependability of autonomous mobile systems, first of all the following terms
and reliance mentioned in the non-formal definitions need a mathematical description. Therefore, a formal, mathematical, theory that is capable of describing these terms is needed. There are different techniques to describe a system mathematicely, that is modeling a system. Among them, the state-space approach can be mentioned, where a system is modelled by a set of input, output and state variables related by first order equations (time domain), and, for example, the frequency domain approach. Another approach is the Behavioural Modelling approach (see Willems, 1991) where a system is modelled only by describing its behaviour. Since the service a system delivers is the behaviour as it is perceived by the user, the later modelling technique was used and is shortly introduced in the following. Additionally, the behaviour based approach is quite common in the field of autonomous mobile robots. This goes back to 1980 where Rodney Brook introduced his subsumption architecture (see Brooks, 1986) . Finally, the behavioural modeling approach offers the opportunity to modell the complete system including both environment and user. Willems (Willems, 1991) defines a system in a universum U . The elements of U are called outcomes of the system. A mathematical model of a system from a behavioural or black-box point of view claims that certain outcomes are possible, while others are not. The model thus defines a specific subset B ⊂ U . This subset is called the behaviour of the system. Subsequently, a (deterministic) mathematical model of a system is defined as: Definition 3.1 A mathematical model is a pair ( U , B ) with the universum U -its elements are called outcomes -and B the behaviour. Given the above definition of a mathematical model, a dynamical system is a set of trajectories describing the system behaviour during the time instants of interest in its signal space W .
In contrast to the state space representation, like x = f ○ x, a dynamical system is defined as: In the above definition a dynamical system is described by a period of time T , the signal space W and a set of time trajectories B . The behaviour of a dynamic system is described by a subset B of all possible time trajectories T ⇒ W . For a trajectory (an event) w : T → W the following applies:
• w ∈ B the model allows the trajectory w • w ∉ B the model forbids the trajectory w The reader is referred to (Willems, 1991) for examples of this modeling technique.
Behaviour-based dependability of autonomous mobile systems
As stated earlier, the service a system delivers is the behaviour as it is perceived by the user. A framework for a mathematical system description according to its behaviour was introduced in the last section. So far the system and its service, from the dependability definition, can be mathematical described. What remains is a fundamental definition of the service a system should deliver and an additional description of the reliance, in terms of the service offered, in the given framework. Finally the attributes of dependability as discussed in section 2 need to be defined in the framework (see also Rüdiger et al., 2007a) .
Behaviour and mission of autonomous mobile systems
As afore mentioned, the behaviour of a system is the set of all possible time trajectories of its external states (see section 3). Due to limitations, either deliberately, caused by a fault in the system, or changes in the environment, this set B could be slightly changed or reduced to a set of behaviours actually available to the system. Although it will probably be only a subset of the behaviours of the original system. This set, which may vary over time, will be defined as follows: Definition 4.1 Let Σ = ( T , W , B ) be a dynamical system then B ⊆ T W is called the set of available behaviours w i (t) : T → W , i = 1...n to the system at time t. Again, the set B is a set of time trajectories within the original signal space W . For the set B it must not necessarily apply B ⊂ B since it can also contain trajectories as a result of a fault in the system or a change in the environment not previously modelled. The set B may also vary over time. Additionally, the set B must not cover all trajectories from the set B since due to implementation reasons not all possible trajectories must be available to the system. Autonomous mobile systems are usually build as general purpose machines that handle different tasks. In the following, these tasks will also be called missions. For estimating the dependability of an autonomous mobile system it is, however, not important to handle all kinds of missions dependable, but only the mission in terms of the service the system should deliver or what the system is intended to do. Such missions are be defined as: Definition 4.2 (Mission) Let Σ = ( T , W , B ) be a time-invariant dynamical system. We say the mission w m of this system is the map w m : T → W with w m ∈ B .
Note that even if an autonomous mobile system is usually build for the handling of different tasks, the actual mission the system has to accomplish is defined as only one special behaviour from the set B . Thus, the mission, here defined, is just a special trajectory or, more precisely, a special behaviour in B . Weak controllability (see Hermann, 1977 ) is assumed since it does not make any sense to define a mission to a system which by definition is not able to accomplish it. If the system is capable of fullfilling its mission w m is defined as follows: Definition 4.3 A mission w m ∈ B for a given dynamical system Σ= ( T , W , B ) with the behaviours B is said to be accomplishable by this system if for all w 1 ∈ B there exists a t ∈ T , t ≥ 0, a behaviour w ∈ B , w : T ∩ [0, t] → W and a behaviour w 2 ∈ B such that w'∈ B , with w' :
and Based on the definition of controllability according (Willems, 1991) a mission w m is accomplishable if the system can be steered from any past trajectory (light green trajectory in Fig. 2 ) to the beginning of the mission trajectory w m (black trajectory in Fig. 2 ) and can then be steered along the mission trajectory (red and blue trajectories in 
Behaviour based attributes of dependability
Before continuing with the definition of dependability for autonomous mobile systems, the basic attributes of dependability must be defined in a behavioural context. Only the main important attributes for dependability of autonomous mobile systems are introduced. Please refer to (Rüdiger et al., 2007a) for an advanced description and (Rüdiger et al., 2007b) for the subset of attributes needed for measuring the dependability of autonomous mobile systems.
Reliability
A common (see e.g. Dubrova, 2006) unformal definition for reliability is:
Reliability R| t is the probability that the system will operate correctly in a specified operating environment in the interval [0, t] , given that it worked at time 0.
An autonomous system is, thus, said to be reliable if the system state does not leave the set of admissible trajectories B . The reliability of a system can be defined as:
The system is said to be reliable in the period [0, t] if for all 0 ≤ t 1 ≤ t the system state is w(t 1 ) ∈ B . Correspondingly, the reliability of the system is the probability that the system is reliable.
Availability
Availability is typically important for real-time systems where a short interruption can be tolerated if the deadline is not missed.
Availability A| t is the probability that a system is operational at the instant of time t.
In contrast to reliability the availability is defined at a time instant t while the reliability is defined in a time interval. Definition 4.5 Let Σ = ( T , W , B ), T = Z or R , be a time-invariant dynamical system. The system is said to be available at time t if w(t) ∈ B . Correspondingly, the availability of the system is the probability that the system is available.
Safety
From the reliability point of view, all failures are equal. In case of safety, those failures are further divided into fail-safe and fail-unsafe ones. Safety is reliability with respect to failures that may cause catastrophic consequences. Therefore safety is unformaly defined as (see e.g. Dubrova, 2006) : Safety S(t) of a system is the probability that the system will either perform its function correctly or will discontinue its operation in a fail-safe manner.
For the formal definition of safety an area S is introduced, as in (Badreddin & Abdel-Geliel, 2004) , which leads to catastrophic consequences when left. In the latter case it is, however, assumed that this Dynamic Safety Margin is fully contained in the stability region while S is defined to be around B . This margin is, like B , highly system specific, but can be set equal to B in the case of restrictive systems. Figure 3 . Safety: The system trajectory w leaves the set of admissible trajectories B but is still considered to be safe since it remains inside S Definition 4.6 Let Σ = ( T , W , B ), T = Z or R , be a time-invariant dynamical system with a safe area S ⊇ B . The system is said to be safe if for all t ∈ T the system state w(t) ∈ S . This definition is consistent with the idea that a safe system is either operable or not operable but in a safe state.
Behaviour based dependability
Having defined the behaviour of a system and the mission, which corresponds to the service the system should deliver, the dependability of the system can be defined as: Definition 4.7 A time-invariant dynamical system Σ= ( T , W , B ) with behaviours B and a mission w m ∈ B is said to be (gradually) dependable in the period T ∈ T if, for all t ∈ T, mission w m can be (gradually) accomplished.
Behaviour based dependability measure
The basic idea behind the dependability measure proposed in the last section is to define the dependability based on the behaviour of the system. For this purpose, a desired behaviour, which was called mission w m (t), was defined for a system and the dependability measure was proposed to be depending on the total of deviation between the actual system behaviour w(t) and the desired behaviour w m (t). In order to be able to actually measure the dependability this definition must, however, be more sophisticated.
Requirements for a dependability measure
Before proposing a function for measuring the dependability the characteristics this dependability function should posses are introduced. In the following, the function for the dependability will be called D .
• D (t) should be a continuous time-dependent function • D (t) should be positive, strictly monotone decreasing • D (t) should be normalized between 0 and 1, where 1 means dependable and 0 means not dependable • D (t) should be a dimensionless quantity The dependability must be measured during and after the mission, hence the dependability measure D (t) must be a time dependant function. The normalization and the non-dimensionalization is obvious in order to achieve a system and unit independent measure. The limitation to the domain between 0 and 1 was chosen so that dependability measure is comperable between different system and application domains. D (t) should be strictly monotonic decreasing since a system is less dependable, i.e. undependability is more likely to occur, the longer a system runs.
Definition of dependability measure
The system trajectory w(t) is the evolution of the system state. The distance between this trajectory and the mission w m (t), together with the distance to the safety area S will be the main idea of the measure for dependability. After the system Σ has completed its mission, the overall mission deviation D m of system and its mission w m is proposed as the sum of all deviations  2 (w(t),w m (t)). In the following, the functional  2 (w(t),w m (t)) will be abbreviated as  2 (t). Thus, the overall mission deviation can be defined as:
( 1) Where  2 (t) is an appropriate measure of the deviation between mission trajectory w m and system trajectory w and consequently a combination of different distance measurements, including the distance to the safety area S . The term max  ( ( ) 2 ) represents the maximum deviation during this particular mission. Those distance measurements will be discussed in detail in the following. More important than knowing the system dependability after completion of the mission is knowing the dependability during the mission. At time, t the time dependent overall mission deviation D(t) can be measured by means of (2) Note that the integration limits for the second integral changed from (1) to (2). In order to calculate D (t) during the mission an estimation for max  ( 2 ()) must be used. This value depends on the distance function  2 (t) used and will be discussed together with the calculation of  2 (t) in the following. Furthermore, in (1) and (2) assures that the function for the time dependent overall deviation D is a positive function. The problem with this function for D(t), is that, besides that it is unnormalized, D(t) is equal to zero if there is no deviation between the desired trajectory w m (t) and the actual system trajectory w(t). Hence, in this case, the dependability derived from this function would be zero. For the time dependent overall mission deviation (2) the value for o min is:
Non-dimensionalization and normalization
The dependability function, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, should have a codomain of [0.
.1], consequently the values for n min and n max should be:
n min = 0 (5) and
With these values the normalization function is reduced to:
The value o max for the unnormalized dependability D can be set to
If at least one  2 (t) > 0 for t ∈ [0..t m ] the normalized dependability D (t) can be computed from (2) with (7) and (8) to:
Nevertheless, the problems with this function are: 1. It only exists if at least one  2 (t) > 0 for t ∈ [0..t m ]. In other words, it only exists if at least a small deviation between the desired behaviour w m and the actual behaviour w occurred. 2. It is subject to the calculation of  2 (t). Thereby max  ( 2 ()) cannot be estimated in advance and dependability cannot be computed during the mission. To finally overcome both problems, a system-independent way for computing  2 (t), which is additionally normalized between [0 . . . 1], is proposed. Having this, max  ( 2 ()) can be estimated equal to 1 and (10) can be estimated to This finally leads to the desired system independent, normalized function D (t) of dependability. D can now be computed from (9) to:
If a systemindependent way to compute  2 (t) between [0 . . . 1] exists this function for the dependability posses all required properties stated at the beginning of this chapter.
Computing

() t ε
For computing the elements of  2 (t) it is not only important to address the distance between the system state and the mission trajectory but also to address the different dimensions of dependability such as reliability, availability, etc. For a behavioural definition of these attributes please refer to (Rüdiger et al., 2007a) . Furthermore, the distance of the system state to the safe area S also needs to be taken into account. Thus,  2 (t) usually consists of different elements reflecting the different attributes of dependability for this special system. From (2) and (9) it follows that if  2 (t) is a combination of different measures
setting again max( 2 () i t ε ) = 1, for i = 1 . . . n, this can be reduced to:
As stated in the previous section, 
This measure is, however, not normalized and not necessarily between 0 . . . 1. In order to achieve the remaining two points, too, the following distance measure is proposed derived from (15):
In (16) w m (t) is the desired (mission) behaviour and w(t) the actual behaviour of the system. The parameter w dev describes how severely a deviation from the mission trajectory influences the system's dependability. It must be chosen greater than zero and have the same dimension as w(t). The lower w dev is chosen the more a deviation from the desired behaviour is rated (see Fig. 4 ). The proposed distance measure is therefore dimensionless and normalized between [0 and 1]. 
Safety
one of the most important elements of  2 (t). As proposed in Section 4.2.3 a safety area S is introduced which when left will lead to catastrophic consequences. The minimum euclidian distance between a system trajectory w(t) and the border of the safety area S at time t will be taken as a basis for the measure of 2 ()
This distance is called d S (w(t)) and will be abbreviated as follows d S (t) for the minimum distance between the actual system states w(t) and the border of the safety area and d Sm (t) for the minimum distance between the mission trajectory w m (t) and the border of the safety are at time t. 
Timely mission accomplishment
For a number of systems it is not only important that the system adequately follows the mission trajectory but that the system follows the mission trajectory at a given time. A good example for such systems is a heard-lung machine where it is not sufficient that the system gives the right pulses, they must be performed at given timesteps. Another important example, especially in the field of controlling autonomous mobile real-time systems, is the class of periodic behaviours, i.e. velocity control or collision avoidance. In the latter example, the exact time execution of a given behaviour is more important then the exact execution of the behaviour itself. 
As in (16) and (17) 
Reliability
As stated in section 2, reliability R| t describes the probability according to which the system will operate correctly in a specified operating environment in an interval [0, t] . For 2 () R t ε this means that 1 − R| t describes the probability that the system will fail in the interval [0...t]. Setting t = t m the latter probability can be directly used and thus 2 () R t ε is proposed as: (20) www.intechopen.com 
Availability
In contrast to reliability, availability is defined at a time instant t while reliability is defined in a time interval. The availability A| t describes the probability that a system is operational at the instant of time t. As for the reliability, this means for 2 () A t ε that 1−A| t describes the probability that the system is not operable at time instant t. This probability can be directly used when computing 2 ()
This definition satisfies two statements about availability mentioned in section 2: 1. If a system cannot be repaired, its availability equals its reliability 2. The integral over the mission time of 2 () A t ε in the dependability function equal the average availability, also called interval or mission availability as introduced in section 2.
Additional
According to the system and its mission, additional measures for  2 (t) might be needed to take into account further special requirements with respect to dependability. As stated earlier, it is important that those 2 () X t ε are dimensionaless and are normalized between 0 and 1, where 0 means dependable and 1 means not dependable.
Examples for measuring the dependability
To present the adaptability of the dependability definition proposed above, the following two examples may serve as a demonstration.
Example 1: autonomous transport system
To clarify the behaviour based dependability measurement, an autonomous mobile system with only one position degree of freedom is used. The system is an autonomous transportation system build to autonomously reach different positions which could be, for example, stopping points on a track. For the dependability measurement only the position on the track is considered in the first example. The velocity and acceleration of the autonomous transportation system will be initially disregarded in this example.
Behaviour based system description
For the dependability measurement proposed in the last section, the system will be modelled as described in Section 3. Since the system only has one position degree of freedom it can only move forward and backward on the track, the signal space of the system is W = R . The time of interest for this system is T = R + . For the description of the behaviour B , the train model is needed. A simple train model with rolling friction derived from Newtons Law is used for that purpose. According to Newtons-Law, the sum of forces acting on an object is equal to the mass of that object, multiplied by its acceleration. The mass of the train is assumed to be M. The forces acting on the train are, on the one hand, the driving force F a and, on the other hand the friction force F r = μF n (μ represents the coefficient of rolling friction, F n the force parallel to the planes normal). It is assumed that the train only moves in a plane, thus there is no inclination, etc. Consequently, the force parallel to the normal of the plane F n can be set equal to the force of gravity F n = F g = Mg, with g being the acceleration due to gravity. A diagram of the system with the forces used in this model is shown in Fig. 8 . The system can thus be described according to the following equations. According to the behavioural based approach set forth in section 3, the autonomous mobile transportation system can be described as follows.
The corresponding Matlab Simulink Model is shown in Fig. 9 . The position and the velocity of the system are controlled by simple PI-controllers (see Fig. 10 and 11) . Of all possible Figure 9 . Matlan Simulink model of an autonomous transportation system. M is the mass of the system, μ the friction coefficient and g the acceleration due to gravity Figure 10 . Velocity loop of an autonomous transportation system. The system velocity is controlled by a simple PI controller. Figure 11 . Position loop of an autonomous transportation system. The position of the system is controlled by a simple PI controller system behaviours from the set B only a subset B ⊂ B is available according to the mass and the maximum possible driving force of the system. In this example it is further assumed that the system is able to completely follow the given velocities and accelerations.
Behaviour based dependability measurement
The mission of the above modelled autonomous transportation system is to reach consecutively different positions on the track. The mission time in this example is set to 2400 time units. The system should thus accomplish a desired behaviour w m (t) with its given behaviours B ⊂ B . The set of desired behaviours for this example is generated with a Matlab Simulink model. For this purpose, the signal builder block is used (see Fig 12) to define different desired positions on the track. The reference signal is fed to the real train system to simulate the actual behaviour (Model in Fig. 8 ) and also to the reference train system (Reference Model in Fig. 8 ) to generate the desired behaviour. With the aid of the generated behaviour in the reference model, this will be taken as the desired behaviour w m (t) or mission of the autonomous transportation system and used for the computation of the system's dependability. This model shows an example of the different opportunities to measure the dependability of such systems. At first, it is assumed that the position of the autonomous transportation system can be measured adequately. Consequently it is assumed that the measurement of the position itself does not produce additional errors. Up till now only system internal errors or deviations were considered as deviations between the reference model and the real system. It is also possible that changes in the model or the environment, as implicitly considered in this case, may occur. Unexpected wearout of wheels, resulting from e.g. a smaller wheel radius can produce errors, and as such lead to a deviation from the desired behaviour, if the position of the train is only measured on the basis of the wheel rotations. Figure 12 . A Matlab signal builder block is used together with a reference and the real system in order to generate the actual and desired behaviour of the system. When generating the desired behaviour in this example it is assumed that the system is functioning properly. Thus, the reference model reflects the system adequately. Noise in the sensors, for example, is not explicitly modelled. Of course, this could have been also introduced in the model for a better computation of the desired behaviour. In the first example, two different simulations are carried out. 1. To simulate an additive error, a constant value is added to the position measurement.
This error could be due to faulty initialization, slippage etc, but could also because of an error in the model of such autonomous transportation system. 2. To demonstrate as to what extend noise in sensors or measurement uncertainty affect the dependability of a system, noise is added to the measurement of the position. The results of the two simulations are shown in Fig. 13 . The dotted red line in each case represents the desired behaviour, thus the mission trajectory w m . The actual system behaviour is shown as blue line. The measured dependability for this example is shown as a dashed green line.
Example 2: Small train
Since the autonomous transportation system is built for the transport of people and as such represents a safety critical system, system safety is also considered in the second example. In the second example, besides the position of the system, the velocity is considered when calculating dependability. In addition to the above mentioned two simulations, two other scenarios were added for the computing of dependability. 1. In order to enhance the dependability calculation, a desired and actual behaviour of the velocity was added. For the simulation of parameter errors, which are multiplicative, the velocity of the real system is multiplied by a constant value. 2. A safety area, as proposed, was added for the velocity. Consequently, the relative 
Conclusion
There exist numerous non-formal definitions for dependability (see Carter, 1982; Laprie, 1992; Badreddin, 1999; Dubrova, 2006; Avizienis et al., 2004a just to name a few). When applying those non-formal definitions to a specific system the resulting dependability measure usually is only valid for this specific system and only in rare cases transferable to a family of equal systems. Small changes in the system or environment, however, render those measurements usually useless when it comes to measuring or even comparing the dependability of different systems. Autonomous mobile robots are often described by their behaviour. This aspect was utilized in this chapter for the definition of dependability in a behavioural context in order to obtain an easy to apply and computable formula for the dependability of systems. Since this
